From: hrubin@odds.stat.purdue.edu (Herman Rubin) Subject: Re: Real Analysis limited to Computable Functions Date: 12 Aug 2000 20:32:08 -0500 Newsgroups: sci.math Summary: [missing] In article <20000812153335.01142.00000118@ng-cq1.aol.com>, Richard Batchelor wrote: >What happens if one restricts oneself to COMPUTABLE functions, and investigates >their properties? (Of course, every number used is computable, every sequence >considered is computable and so on.) What results of classical real analysis >are still true? > As far as I can tell, they ALL are. I think that in fact the computable >numbers satisfy the axioms for real numbers, and so the collection of all >computable numbers is a model of the reals. Is this correct? > Is there any theorem of classical real analysis that is not true for the >computables? I believe that there is a constructive function of a real number, which is constructively continuous, such that the location of the maximum is not constructive. The value of the maximum is necessarily constructive. -- This address is for information only. I do not claim that these views are those of the Statistics Department or of Purdue University. Herman Rubin, Dept. of Statistics, Purdue Univ., West Lafayette IN47907-1399 hrubin@stat.purdue.edu Phone: (765)494-6054 FAX: (765)494-0558 ============================================================================== From: kramsay@aol.commangled (Keith Ramsay) Subject: Re: Real Analysis limited to Computable Functions Date: 14 Aug 2000 01:33:02 GMT Newsgroups: sci.math In article <20000812153335.01142.00000118@ng-cq1.aol.com>, dbatchelo1@aol.com (Richard Batchelor) writes: | As far as I can tell, they ALL are. I think that in fact the computable |numbers satisfy the axioms for real numbers, and so the collection of all |computable numbers is a model of the reals. Is this correct? Someone recently asked the same question, but I suppose it's worth answering again. It's consistent with constructive mathematics that every real number is recursive (computable), and every function on the reals is recursive. Certain nonconstructive theorems of analysis fail to hold for the recursive reals-- a lot of them actually. They all have constructive counterparts, although they sometimes look uglier in that form. As someone pointed out, the least upper bound property fails for the recursive reals. There exists a recursive increasing sequence of recursive reals which is bounded above, but without a recursive least upper bound. The least upper bound lemma is woven into classical analysis in a fairly pervasive way. Every recursive function on the recursive reals is pointwise continuous, a theorem discovered independently by Ceitin and Kreisel-Lacome-Shoenfeld. Standard examples of functions defined everywhere but discontinuous at a point fail to be recursive: there is no algorithm for determining whether a recursive real number is positive, negative, or zero, for example. The following construction is the starting point for a number of the others. You can read about it, if you are interested enough, in Beeson's book, _The Foundations of Constructive Mathematics_. For any epsilon>0, there exists a recursive sequence (a1,b1), (a2,b2), (a3,b3),... of open intervals which cover the recursive reals, but where |b1-a1|+|b2-a2|+...+|b_N-a_N|0. The reciprocal of that function is a recursive, pointwise continuous function on the recursive reals which is unbounded. If we take the arctan of that, we get a function with a least upper bound, i.e. pi/2, but which doesn't attain the least upper bound at any recursive points. That unusual cover of the recursive reals shows also that measure theory in its usual formulation is fairly far from true for recursive analysis. Another source of counterexamples in recursive mathematics is the construction of a binary tree with infinitely many nodes, but without any recursive infinite branch. A hypothetical being with the ability to look ahead and see whether either the left or the right branch is a dead end (eventually!) can climb the tree on an infinite branch, but we can arrange so that there is no computable way to do it. There is a constructive theorem that the reals are uncountable. On the other hand, it's also constructive that there is a subset of the integers with a recursive map from it onto the recursive reals. If it were true that every real was recursive, this would contradict the nonconstructive theorem that every infinite subset of a countable set is countable. The subject strikes me as somewhat awkward because of the mixture of different assumptions which ordinarily gets drawn into it. We consider a set S, with some of the following assumptions made: 1. S is the reals 2. S is the recursive reals. 3. The reals are all recursive. 4. The law of excluded middle holds. 4 is the standard nonconstructive axiom. You are taught about the consequences of assuming 1 and 4 in school. A constructive mathematician will happily tell you the consequences which follow from just 1 by itself-- the constructive theorems of analysis. The ones I know of tend not to care all that much about recursive analysis, however the theorems they know of (and the ones which they know aren't constructive) also shed some light on the consequences of assuming 1-3 (each of which follows from the other two), which sort of helps to answer your question. But then assuming you really want to know what is classically true of the recursive reals, you want to know the consequences of 2 and 4 together. While it's a parallel story, it's also a contradictory one, since 3 and 4 are incompatible. It seems to me that having the two similar but contradictory stories in mind at the same time tends to make things confusing. Keith Ramsay ============================================================================== From: kramsay@aol.commangled (Keith Ramsay) Subject: Re: Real Analysis limited to Computable Functions Date: 17 Aug 2000 02:27:18 GMT Newsgroups: sci.math In article <20000814112938.20856.00000165@ng-fq1.aol.com>, dbatchelo1@aol.com (Richard Batchelor) writes: |I had convinced myself that the opposite was true; that the LUB was |necessarily |computable, because it could be computed by evaluating the sequence and so |getting closer and closer to the LUB. Could you give me more details? The number 0N are within 2^{-M}, we have to be sure that the Turing machines from among the first M which haven't halted by step N don't halt ever. It's an example of what Bishop called in his textbook "fickle convergence". For each epsilon>0, there exists N such that for any indexes i_1For any |>epsilon>0, there exists a recursive sequence (a1,b1), (a2,b2), |>(a3,b3),... of open intervals which cover the recursive reals, but |>where |b1-a1|+|b2-a2|+...+|b_N-a_N|=1. Take an infinite sequence epsilon_1, epsilon_2,... of positive numbers which sums to epsilon. Run a batch of Turing machines in parallel, which are candidates for machines computing real numbers. Run the n-th Turing machine until it responds to a request for an approximation to within epsilon_n/2 of the real it computes. If machine n should happen to stop with a rational number q on its output, insert (q-epsilon_n/2, q+epsilon_n/2) into the enumeration of rational intervals. There is no way, of course, to arrange to get the intervals in order by the index n. Some of the machines run forever, and we just keep running them in parallel with the others, occasionally adding another Turing machine to the batch. It may be that machine n gives us an answer despite not being a machine which computes a real number-- maybe it generates an inconsistent sequence, or fails to halt for some other input. This is okay. What we're relying upon is the fact that every machine which does compute a real number will eventually manage to compute an epsilon_n/2 approximation of its number, on the slies of time we give it, and thus the associated interval will get included in the list and cover the associated real number. The sequence of lengths of intervals converges only in the weak sense like the previous example. Keith Ramsay